Recently becoming urgent problem of managing distributed processes of production, transmission and consumption of energy. This fact is associated with the emergence of a significant number of generators and the possibility of a primary control on all elements of the grid. In this connection, in proposed three-level distributed power grid management, which includes the upper level of segmentation networks, distributed control average frequency and power level and a lower primary control. The methods of control for each of the above levels, the results of simulation.

Keywords: smart grid management system, distributed control, frequency control and power.

Project financing provides an efficient allocation of risks between key counterparties of project initiatives, which are best suited and have the most appropriate instruments to cover this risks. The study of structural and operational principles of project financing risk management instruments: contractual arrangements and associated guarantees (turnkey (engineering, procurement, and construction) agreement, contractual structures of the operating period: offtake / procurement agreements, operation and maintenance agreement), contingency funds, cash trap, risk compensation devices, derivative contracts and insurance – allowed to reveal specifics of their application and assess their implication for mitigation the project financing risks and for success of the project financing initiatives.

Keywords: project finance, risk management, project financing risks, turnkey (engineering, procurement, and construction) agreement, put-or-pay contract, take-or-pay contract, operations and maintenance agreement, debt service coverage ratio, cash trap

Contract organization of project finance allow to reduce the asymmetric information, limiting the possibility of opportunistic actions of each participant. The back-to-back principle, that is underlying for contractual arrangements, increases total project return and provides transfer and split of highest possible number of risks directly to the contractual counterparty, which is best suited and have the most appropriate instruments to cover this risks. Tripartite deeds of project financing can be considered as a cooperative non-zero sum game, which provides compensation in proportion to covered risk and member's contribution (extent of assumed obligations or provided funds). Multiple contracts of project finance initiatives allow to allocate risks pro rata the ability of participants, without reducing the amount of final win of all parties.

Keywords: project finance, project financing risks, asymmetric information, agency theory, contractual arrangements, back-to-back principle, concession agreement, purchaser contract, tripartite deed, game theory

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