The behavior of the participants in the production process at the enterprise is modeled in cases of two-level and three-level hierarchy in the conditions of corruption, checking products for quality and punishing players in a number of cases. The formulas for the interaction of players and their winning strategies are given. A number of functions are standard formulas. The Stackelberg equilibrium was obtained programmatically for a two-level system in statics, for a three-level system in dynamics. The proposed formulation is based on the theories of G.A. Ugolnitsky and A.B. Usov. The results obtained allow us to identify shortcomings in a number of enterprises, as well as in theory, and continue its development.

Keywords: analytic-geometric analysis, simulation modeling, Stackelberg equilibrium, hierarchical system, game-theoretic modeling, corruption in organizations

Difference games settings of the two-level and three-level dynamic quality management in an organizational-economic system with corruption are proposed. A quality indicator is considered as a state variable that changes in time due to a dynamic equation. A satisfaction of some quality requirements is obligatory, in the three-level model penalties are charged otherwise. The paper develops a concept of modeling of corruption in the hierarchical control systems from the point of view of the necessary conditions of sustainable development. Some hypotheses of model identification are discussed.

Keywords: quality management, modeling of corruption, dynamic games